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2211-3797 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BYUsing laboratory experimental data, we test the uncertainty of social state transitions in various compet-
ing environments of ﬁxed paired two-person constant sum 2  2 games. It ﬁrstly shows that, the distri-
butions of social strategy transitions are not erratic but obey the principle of the maximum entropy
(MaxEnt). This ﬁnding indicates that human subject social systems and natural systems could share
wider common backgrounds.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The principle of the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) is introduced
by Jaynes [19], rooting in Boltzmann, Gibbs and Shannon [20,26].
As a methodology, MaxEnt has gained its wide applications in nat-
ural science and engineering. The advantage of this methodology is
to provide rich information based on a very limited information. In
economics, MaxEnt approach has also gained its wide applications,
e.g., in market equilibrium [2,28], in wealth and income distribu-
tion [9,31], in ﬁrm growth rates [1] and in behavior modeling
[30]. Theoretical interpreting or modeling of the distributions of
social outcomes with MaxEnt is growing.
Considering the importance of MaxEnt, to carry out laboratory
experiments to investigate this fundamental rule is necessary
[15]. Only quite recently, entropy is ﬁrstly measured in experimen-
tal economics systems to evaluate social outcomes by Bednar et al.
[4] and Cason et al. [7]. Then, Xu et al. [36] ﬁnd the human system
in laboratory ﬁxed-paired two-person constant-sum 2  2 games
obey the MaxEnt. To the best of our knowledge, these are almost
the total experimental works related to entropy or MaxEnt in social
research ﬁeld till now. In the ﬁrst experimental investigation in
MaxEnt, Xu et al. [36] focus on the static observable — distribution
and the entropy. A direct one-step-forward question is, in the
experimental social interaction systems, whether the dynamic
observable ﬁts MaxEnt or not?x: +86 571 87176578.
-NC-ND license.Answering this question is the main aim of this report. The
paper is organized as follows: section two describes the relative
notions; section three introduces the experiments and reports of
the experimental social transitions; section four provides the Max-
Ent prediction relating to the social transitions of the investigated
experiments; section ﬁve reports the results; discussion and
summary are at last.2. Relative notions
2.1. Two person constant sum 2  2 game
Two-person zero-sum games describe situations in which two
individuals are absolutely opposite to each other, where one’s gain
is always the other’s loss [21]. Constant sum game is strategically
equivalent to zero sum games in mathematical view.
In a two-person constant-sum 2  2 game, each player has two
strategies. For a row player, the strategy set is (U,D) and for a col-
umn player, the strategy set is (L,R). The sum of the two players’
payoffs is the same for any outcome. Let S denote the sum of the
payoffs of the two players. Any constant sum 2  2 game can be
written in the form of Fig. 1. A, B, C and D are the payoffs for
row player under four combinations of two players’ strategies
respectively and S-A, S-B, S-C and S-D are for column player
respectively. If (A > C) \ (B < D) \ (A > B) \ (C < D) or (A < C) \
(B > D) \ (A < B) \ (C > D) as in [25], there exists an unique mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE).
Fig. 1. Payoff matrix of a constant sum game. A, B, C and D are the payoffs for row
player under four combinations of two player’s strategies respectively and S-A, S-B,
S-C and S-D are for column player respectively. S denotes the sum of the payoffs to
the two players.
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The social state xij [23] can be taken as the combination of two
players’ strategies, herein i indicates the column player’s strategy
and j indicates the row player’s strategy. Let p be the probability
of strategy R for column player and q be the probability of strategy
D for row player, the social state can be described by xij = (p, q).
During a game, each player chooses a pure strategy from his own
strategy set in a round t, the combination of these two strategies
can be taken as a social state xt in that round, xt = (pt, qt). Obviously,
there are altogether four possible social states in one round, i.e.,
(0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1) indicating LU, LD, RU and RD respec-
tively, and we simplify them as x00, x01, x10, and x11. In Fig. 2(b)
and (f), the gray dots represent the social states.
If the game is repeated, observation denoted as Xij at each state
xij can be accumulated and the results of these games are shown in
the last four columns of Table 1.2.3. Social transition
In this paper, we investigate the social transitions within the
strategy states in the strategy space. In a repeated game, for a given
round t, the social state is xt = (pt, qt); similarly, the social state in
the previous round can be denoted as xt1:¼(pt1, qt1) and in the
next round can be denoted as xt+1:¼(pt+1, qt+1). For each givenFig. 2. Transition distribution and aggregated transition. (a) Four actual backward trans
blue arrows indicate the directions of transitions; the numerics indicate the frequencies
mean starting point xt1 ¼ ðpt1; qt1Þ ¼ ð0:63;0:69Þ; (c) four expected backward transiti
indicate the directions of transitions and the numerics indicate the related frequencies;
backward transition constraint in (b);(e) four actual forward transitions T01?00, T01?01, T
numerics indicate the related actual frequencies of transitions; (f) the aggregated forwar
four MaxEnt expected forward transitions; (h) an example which is not in agreement with
and (e) comes from the experiment — game 1.round t, there exists the next round and previous round except
the ﬁrst round and last round in a experimental session. So, there
exists a social forward transition vector (denoted as T+) indicating
the transition from xt to xt+1, and a social backward transition vector
(denoted as T) indicating the transition from xt1 to xt.
In a two-person 2  2 game, there are four social states, so there
are all 32 transitions (shown in the ﬁrst column in Table 2), includ-
ing the four backward (forward) transitions for each of the four
states. These 32 transitions should be the samples for MaxEnt
testing.2.4. Distribution of transitions of a given state
During a game, for a given social state, there exists four forward
transitions and four backward transitions, respectively. This means
that there should exist a distribution of transitions.
For example, Fig. 2(a) is demonstrating the distribution of the
transitions of the given state x01, in which the four backward tran-
sitions T01 00, T01 01, T01 10 and T01 11 come from the four states
x00, x01, x10 and x11, respectively; the blue arrows indicate the
directions of transitions and the numerics indicate the related ac-
tual frequencies. The distribution of backward transitions T01 00,
T01 01, T01 10, T01 11 are 55, 106, 78, and 193, respectively. Simi-
larly, Fig. 2(e) illustrates the distribution of the forward transitions.2.5. Aggregated transition of a state
The existence of distribution of transitions of a given state
implicates that there are many backward starting points and for-
ward terminal points. So, for a given state xi0 j0 , we can get a so-
called the mean starting point xt1 ¼ ðpt1; qt1Þ and a aggregated
backward transition T (it is natural that T ¼ xi0 j0  xt1), and also
the mean terminal point xtþ1 ¼ ðptþ1; qtþ1Þ and a aggregated forward
transition Tþ (it is natural that Tþ ¼ xtþ1  xi0 j0 ). The aggregated for-
ward transition T+ is the same as the experimental dynamics obser-
vable in literatures (called as change in a given state in Ref. [3] and
the mean jump-out vector of a given state in Ref. [33]).
For example, supposing the given state is (0, 1), Fig. 2(b) illus-
trates the aggregated backward transition T, as the average ofitions T01 00, T01 01, T01 10, T01 11 for the given state x01 from x00, x01, x10, x11; the
of transitions, respectively; (b) the aggregated backward transition T and related
ons for x01 from four starting points x0 0, x01, x10, x11 with MaxEnt, the blue arrows
(d) an example which is not in agreement with MaxEnt but satisﬁes the aggregated
01?10, T01?11 from x01, the red arrows indicate the directions of transitions, and the
d transition Tþ and relative mean terminal point xtþ1 ¼ ðptþ1; qtþ1Þ ¼ ð0:40;0:45Þ; (g)
MaxEnt but satisﬁes the actual aggregated forward transition constraint. Data in (a)
Table 1
Parameters and observations of the 11 game.a
Game A B C D S Group Rounds X00 X01 X10 X11
g1 77 35 8 48 100 9 500 994 433 1659 1405
g2 73 74 87 20 100 9 500 1373 250 2401 467
g3 63 8 1 17 100 9 500 664 333 1955 1539
g4 55 75 73 60 100 9 500 643 1611 588 1649
g5 5 64 93 40 100 9 500 548 891 1153 1899
g6 46 54 61 23 100 9 500 1135 706 1729 921
g7 89 53 82 92 100 9 500 502 1840 825 1324
g8 88 38 40 55 100 9 500 353 663 1443 2032
g9 40 76 91 23 100 9 500 1157 860 1366 1108
g10 69 5 13 33 100 9 500 443 465 995 2588
g11 5 0 0 5 5 12 300 837 913 907 931
a g1 to g11 indicate game 1 to game 11, respectively. The symbols A, B, C, D and S refer to Fig. 1. Group is the number of the pairs of human subjects playing the games.
Rounds is the game repeated times in each pair.
Table 2
Actual frequencies of the transitions of 11 games.
T g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00 00 464 764 184 314 124 529 143 111 606 116 196
T00 01 155 52 73 67 68 99 169 95 67 139 241
T00 10 274 504 327 193 207 382 89 70 362 123 182
T00 11 102 53 79 66 149 124 98 75 120 63 218
T01 00 55 86 35 239 213 226 104 11 263 43 149
T01 01 106 48 89 1054 217 311 1191 264 365 121 216
T01 10 78 69 100 70 191 86 66 62 85 55 231
T01 11 193 45 111 245 268 85 482 327 145 247 319
T10 00 401 446 383 45 51 235 145 169 144 232 281
T10 01 83 75 99 65 143 86 99 82 99 91 263
T10 10 1021 1722 1046 258 483 1029 478 858 691 370 191
T10 11 152 160 424 223 476 380 103 333 434 302 173
T11 00 74 77 62 45 160 145 110 62 144 52 211
T11 01 89 75 72 425 463 210 381 222 329 114 193
T11 10 286 106 482 67 272 232 192 453 228 447 303
T11 11 958 209 925 1115 1006 332 641 1297 409 1976 221
T+ g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00?00 464 764 184 314 124 529 143 111 606 116 196
T00?01 55 86 35 239 213 226 104 11 263 43 149
T00?10 401 446 383 45 51 235 145 169 144 232 281
T00?11 74 77 62 45 160 145 110 62 144 52 211
T01?00 155 52 73 67 68 99 169 95 67 139 241
T01?01 106 48 89 1054 217 311 1191 264 365 121 216
T01?10 83 75 99 65 143 86 99 82 99 91 263
T01?11 89 75 72 425 463 210 381 222 329 114 193
T10?00 274 504 327 193 207 382 89 70 362 123 182
T10?01 78 69 100 70 191 86 66 62 85 55 231
T10?10 1021 1722 1046 258 483 1029 478 858 691 370 191
T10?11 286 106 482 67 272 232 192 453 228 447 303
T11?00 102 53 79 66 149 124 98 75 120 63 218
T11?01 193 45 111 245 268 85 482 327 145 247 319
T11?10 152 160 424 223 476 380 103 333 434 302 173
T11?11 958 209 925 1115 1006 332 641 1297 409 1976 221
a g1 indicates game 1, the rest analogize.
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mean starting point xt1 ¼ ð0:63;0:69Þ; In Fig. 2(f), Tþ, as the aver-
age of the four vectors in Fig. 2(e), is (0.40, 0.55) and then
xtþ1 ¼ ð0:40;0:45Þ.
3. Data set and experimental transitions
3.1. Experiments and data set
Experimental economics methods are well suited to evaluate
theories [15]. In this paper, we use the same data set as Ref. [36]
to test the MaxEnt in social strategy transitions. The two-person
constant sum 2  2 game includes 11 different parameters
(Table 1). From game 1 to game 10, each game consists of ninepairs of subjects, each pair play for 500 rounds while for game
11, the game consists of 12 pairs of subjects, each pair play for
300 rounds. These yield 4500 observed social states in each of
game 1 to game 10 and 3600 observed social states in game 11
(for more detail, see Ref. [14,36]).3.2. Experimental distributions of transitions
According to the data set for each of the 11 games, using the
deﬁnition in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we can calculate the actual
experimental distributions of backward transitions and forward
transitions. The results are summarized in Table 2, which should
serve as the targets for testing MaxEnt.
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Numerically, xt1 can be presented by two components
ðpt1; qt1Þ. Using the deﬁnition in Section 2.5, results of all of the
components from experiments are shown in Table 3. The vectors,
xt1, are shown in the sub-ﬁgures in Fig. 3.
For calculating the theoretical backward (forward) distributions
of the transitions from MaxEnt, xt1 ðxtþ1Þ should constraint the
testing of MaxEnt.
4. Theoretical distributions of transitions from MaxEnt
In this paper, in order to have a deeper insight in the dynamic
social observable, we use the aggregated social transitions (T±) as
the constraints for MaxEnt testing. It is clear that for a given state,
without MaxEnt, the distribution of backward (forward) transi-
tions can be arbitrary even given the constraints T± (two examples
are given in Section 6).
For a given state xi0 j0 , the xt1 is assumed to be ðpt1; qt1Þ and
there is no other information. According to MaxEnt suggested by
Jaynes [20], the probability of the backward transitions from the
states to xi0 j0 can be expressed, respectively, as
pðTi0 j0 00jxt1Þ ¼ð1 pt1Þð1 qt1Þ
pðTi0 j0 01jxt1Þ ¼qt1ð1 pt1Þ
pðTi0 j0 10jxt1Þ ¼pt1ð1 qt1Þ
pðTi0 j0 11jxt1Þ ¼pt1qt1
More compactly, the probability of backward transitions from xij to
xi0 j0 , can be expressed as,
pðTi0 j0 ijjxt1Þ ¼ pit1ð1 pt1Þ1iqjt1ð1 qt1Þ1j; ð1Þ
in which {i,j} 2 {0,1}. Similarly, for xi0 j0 and its xtþ1 ¼ ðptþ1; qtþ1Þ, the
probability of the forward transition from xi0 j0 to state xij can be ex-
pressed as
pðTi0 j0!ijjxtþ1Þ ¼ pitþ1ð1 ptþ1Þ1iqjtþ1ð1 qtþ1Þ1j; ð2Þ
in which {i,j} 2 {0,1} too.
Comparing to experimental distributions directly, the theoreti-
cal probabilities are multiplied by the observationXi0 j0 (referring to
Table 1) to gain the theoretical distributions. Fig. 2(c) provides an
example to illustrate the theoretical distribution of backward tran-
sitions using the xt1 in Fig. 2(b) and Eq. (1). Similarly, Fig. 2(g)Table 3
Mean starting point xt1 and terminal point xtþ1.
State xt1 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
x00 pt1 0.38 0.41 0.61 0.40 0.65
qt1 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.21 0.40
x01 pt1 0.63 0.46 0.63 0.20 0.52
qt1 0.69 0.38 0.6 0.81 0.55
x10 pt1 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.83
qt1 0.14 0.10 0.27 0.49 0.54
x11 pt1 0.88 0.67 0.91 0.72 0.67
qt1 0.74 0.61 0.65 0.93 0.77
State xtþ1 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
x00 ptþ1 0.48 0.38 0.67 0.14 0.39
qtþ1 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.44 0.68
x01 ptþ1 0.40 0.60 0.51 0.30 0.68
qtþ1 0.45 0.49 0.48 0.92 0.76
x10 ptþ1 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.55 0.65
qtþ1 0.22 0.07 0.30 0.23 0.40
x11 ptþ1 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.81 0.78
qtþ1 0.82 0.54 0.67 0.82 0.67
a g1 indicates game 1, the rest analogize.illustrates the theoretical distribution of forward transitions using
xtþ1 in Fig. 2(f) and Eq. (2); Multiplied factor X refers to the ﬁgure
in last four columns of Table 1.
In summary, according to Eqs. (1) and (2), together with Table 3
as constraints, theoretical probabilities of the transitions can
be obtained. Multiplied by the observation X at the given state,
the distribution of the transitions can be obtained and listed
in Table 4.5. Results
To test MaxEnt is to evaluate the goodness of ﬁt between the
experimental data (in Table 2) and theoretical data (in Table 4).
Fig. 3 plots the results of theoretical transition frequencies (in
horizon, x-axis) and observed experimental transition frequencies
(vertical, y-axis). The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows the results for all 11 games,
and from second to last is game 1 to game 11, respectively. For
each game, there are 32 samples of social strategy transitions.
The cycles in blue indicate the backward transitions and the
crosses in red indicate the forward transitions. Signiﬁcantly, all of
the backward transition samples (blue cycles) and forward
transitions samples (red crosses) are close to the diagonal lines
which mean theoretical values from MaxEnt are close to experi-
mental values.
The liner regression results are shown in Table 5. Obliviously,
each of the liner regression coefﬁcients is very close to 1 and the
p < 0.001. Table 5 also provides the 99% C.I. (conﬁdence interval)
both for linear regression coefﬁcients and intercept constant. All
the lower bound of 99% C.I. of regression coefﬁcients are smaller
than but very close to 1 and the upper bound are larger than but
also very close to 1; then the equal hypothesis of the two variables
cannot be rejected. Meanwhile, for intercept constant (y-intercept,
the point where a line crosses the y-axis), none of the p values is
smaller than 0.42, all of the lower bound of the 99% C.I. are smaller
than 0 and all of the upper bound are larger than 0. Then, the
hypothesis that the regression line cross 0 cannot be rejected.
These statistical results indicate that the hypothesis that theoreti-
cal values statistically equal to experimental observation of the
transitions is supported.
In summary, in the laboratory experimental two-person con-
stant sum 2  2 games, the outcome of the social transitions ﬁts
MaxEnt. In other words, given the mean vector of the transitions
of a given state, the distributions of the all transitions of the giveng6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
0.45 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.48
0.20 0.54 0.48 0.16 0.46 0.55
0.24 0.30 0.59 0.27 0.65 0.60
0.56 0.91 0.89 0.59 0.79 0.58
0.81 0.70 0.83 0.82 0.68 0.40
0.27 0.24 0.29 0.39 0.39 0.48
0.61 0.63 0.86 0.57 0.94 0.56
0.59 0.77 0.75 0.66 0.81 0.45
g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
0.33 0.51 0.65 0.25 0.64 0.59
0.33 0.43 0.21 0.35 0.21 0.43
0.42 0.26 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
0.74 0.85 0.73 0.81 0.51 0.45
0.73 0.81 0.91 0.67 0.82 0.54
0.18 0.31 0.36 0.23 0.5 0.59
0.77 0.56 0.80 0.76 0.88 0.42
0.45 0.85 0.80 0.50 0.86 0.58
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the actual transition frequencies with expected transition frequencies in the experimental games. Horizonal axis is the expected transition frequencies
from MaxEnt hypothesis; meanwhile, vertical axis is the actual transition frequencies. The ﬁrst ﬁgure is the results of all 11 games. Fig. 2nd to last is for game 1 to game 11,
respectively. In the ﬁrst ﬁgure, symbol B (F) in the legend indicates backward (forward). For each game, there are four social states and 16 kinds of social forward transitions
and 16 kinds of backward transitions. The cycles in blue (cross in red) indicate the backward transitions (forward transitions). A dot in diagonal line means the experimental
transition frequencies equal to the theoretical transition frequencies. The sub-ﬁgures in the right down corners are the schematic diagrams for aggregated backward
(forward) transitions in blue arrows (in red arrows).
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exactly.
6. Discussion and conclusion
The main result of this report is that, the social strategy transi-
tions are not erratic but governed by MaxEnt as suggested by Jay-
nes [19]. This result comes from the dynamical observables in the
experiments of human subject competing games [14,36].
6.1. Examples of the necessary of MaxEnt
To make the MaxEnt in social dynamics easier to understand,
we provide two alternative examples in Fig. 2. The ﬁrst example
is in sub-ﬁgure (d), the backward transition distribution, which is
consistent with the aggregated backward transition shown in (b)
but not capture the experiment result in (a). In other words, in
(d), the frequencies for T00 01, T00 00, T00 10 and T00 11 could be
133, 28, 0 and 271. Even though this distribution satisﬁed the con-straint condition (b), it is far away from the experimental distribu-
tion in (a). Second example is for forward state transition in (h);
without MaxEnt, a plausible distribution like the (h) in Fig. 2 does
not provide efﬁcient information of experimental dynamical obser-
vable in (e) with the constraint condition of (f). Alternatively, with
MaxEnt, results in (c) and (g), by using (b) and (f) as the con-
straints, can recover the experimental distribution in (a) and (e),
respectively.
6.2. MaxEnt in social state transition and experimental social
dynamics
In this section, we explain the connection of present results to
the results found in experimental social dynamics.
The social dynamics of human subject systems is an interdisci-
plinary ﬁeld [10,17,24,37]. In this ﬁeld, evolutionary game theory
provides a general mathematical framework for the theoretical
investigation of social dynamics and is used commonly by physi-
cists and economics. However, this theory has rarely gained the
Table 4
Expected transitions frequencies of 11 game by MaxEnt.
T g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00 00 459 754 198 302 116 505 145 106 564 138 197
T00 01 160 62 59 79 76 124 167 100 109 117 240
T00 10 279 514 313 205 215 407 87 75 404 101 181
T00 11 97 43 93 54 141 100 100 70 78 85 219
T01 00 50 84 50 248 195 237 119 30 255 34 152
T01 01 111 50 74 1045 235 300 1176 245 373 130 213
T01 10 83 71 85 61 209 75 51 43 93 64 228
T01 11 188 43 126 254 250 96 497 346 137 238 322
T10 00 415 470 353 56 90 235 184 179 148 195 283
T10 01 69 51 129 54 104 86 60 72 95 128 261
T10 10 1007 1698 1076 247 444 1030 439 848 687 407 189
T10 11 166 184 394 234 515 380 142 343 438 265 175
T11 00 42 60 47 32 142 146 112 72 159 32 224
T11 01 121 92 87 438 481 209 379 212 314 134 180
T11 10 318 123 497 80 290 231 190 443 213 467 290
T11 11 926 192 910 1102 988 333 643 1307 424 1956 234
T+ g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11
T00?00 452 749 187 309 108 508 142 v97 563 125 197
T00?01 67 101 32 244 229 247 105 25 306 34 148
T00?10 413 461 380 50 67 256 146 183 187 223 280
T00?11 62 62 65 40 144 124 109 48 101 61 212
T01?00 143 51 84 92 67 107 198 96 83 129 252
T01?01 118 49 78 1029 218 303 1162 263 349 131 205
T01?10 95 76 88 40 144 78 70 81 83 101 252
T01?11 77 74 83 450 462 218 410 223 345 104 204
T10?00 275 531 300 202 238 382 107 85 345 88 170
T10?01 77 42 127 61 160 86 48 47 102 90 243
T10?10 1020 1695 1073 249 452 1029 460 843 708 405 203
T10?11 287 133 455 76 303 232 210 468 211 412 291
T11?00 53 45 62 55 137 114 88 81 133 44 226
T11?01 242 53 128 256 280 95 492 321 133 266 311
T11?10 201 168 441 234 488 390 113 327 422 321 165
T11?11 909 201 908 1104 994 322 631 1303 422 1957 229
a g1 indicates game 1, the rest analogize.
Table 5
Results of linear regression for T and T+ of each game.
Coef. Ta [99%C.I.]b Const. [99%C.I.]c Coef. T+a [99%C.I.]b Const. [99%C.I.]c
g1 1.019 0.971 1.067 24.497 13.829 1.020 0.950 1.090 33.665 22.369
g2 1.010 0.982 1.039 17.453 11.596 1.012 0.983 1.041 17.993 11.337
g3 0.995 0.943 1.047 19.863 22.717 0.997 0.952 1.041 17.420 19.273
g4 1.009 0.981 1.037 14.445 9.388 1.013 0.978 1.048 18.533 11.146
g5 1.005 0.922 1.088 31.300 28.440 1.007 0.942 1.072 25.466 21.471
g6 1.002 0.956 1.049 17.457 16.123 1.003 0.961 1.045 16.216 14.447
g7 1.012 0.954 1.070 26.656 19.858 1.017 0.970 1.065 23.895 14.080
g8 0.997 0.968 1.026 11.762 13.329 1.000 0.974 1.026 11.121 11.139
g9 1.009 0.909 1.110 36.096 30.798 1.006 0.894 1.118 38.853 35.654
g10 1.008 0.966 1.050 24.502 20.038 1.009 0.972 1.045 21.852 16.953
g11 1.002 0.886 1.119 27.159 26.109 1.011 0.848 1.175 39.890 34.780
Total 1.007 0.995 1.019 6.700 2.889 1.009 0.997 1.020 7.170 2.317
a Liner regression coefﬁcient.
b 99% Conﬁdent Interval for liner regression coefﬁcient.
c 99% Conﬁdent Interval for intercept constant.
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systems quantitatively.1 One point that needs to be emphasized is, most of the experiments are conducted
by the social scientists in the ﬁeld called as experimental economics. All the
experiments are the incentivized laboratory experiments using human subjects.
Traditional experimental testing on social dynamics mainly focus on the convergence
property of the equilibrium (e.g., [6,11,12,27]). Early experiments had demonstrated
the qualitative consistence between the evolutionary dynamics and laboratory social
behaviors [3,13,16,29] but not the quantitative consistence. In experiment data, as
pointed out [5], it is difﬁcult to test out the dynamic patterns (e.g., cycles [5,8]) which
are predicted by evolutionary game theory.Only quite recently, according to the three reports from three
independent research groups, quantitative experimental testing
on evolutionary dynamics is becoming possible. The three reports
are the following. (1) The ﬁrst is the report from Hoffman, Suetens,
Nowak and Gneezy (2012) [18]. In three Rock–Paper–Scissors
games, the authors compare behavior with three different sym-
metric matrices whose mean distances from identical Nash equi-
librium (NE) are equal (unequal) in the classical (evolutionary)
game theory. They ﬁnd the mean distance from NE in a treatment
is larger which is predicted by the replicator dynamics model in
evolutionary game theory. This is the ﬁrst experimental report to
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stable state (ESS) — in evolutionary game theory. In their report,
the simplest replicator dynamics model is used as a reference.
(2) The second is the report from Cason, Friedman and Hopkins
(2012) [8]. Using continuous time experiments, also in Rock–Pa-
per–Scissors games, the authors found cycles directly. More impor-
tantly, they found that the cycle amplitude, frequency and
direction are consistent with standard learning models.2 In their
report [8], the logit dynamics model is used as a reference. Another
important point is ‘‘time’’ served as controlled variable in their
experiments. (3) The third is the report from Xu, Wang and Wang
(2012) [32]. In the two-population random-matched 2  2 games
with 12 different payoff-matrix parameters [25], the experimental
frequencies are found to be linear positive related to the theoretical
frequencies signiﬁcant (>5r). The payoff-normalized replicator
dynamics model is used as the reference. Together with the observed
cyclic velocity vector ﬁeld pattern in experiments [33], evidences
from 2  2 games support the evolutionary game theory as well.
To test the evolutionary dynamics in laboratory human subject
social systems, these are the three experiments which are reported
recently.
Notice that, all the three groups use accumulated observable
(macro observable) to describe the social dynamics behaviors. In
this letter, the macro observables which are used as the constraint
conditions (e.g., the mean aggregated forward transition) are also
macro observable. In this letter, we show that MaxEnt can provide
more dynamics information (micro observable, the state-to-state
transits) from the limited accumulated observable (macro observa-
ble) in the experiments.
In words, present report might provide a paradigm — the micro
and macro dynamical observables could be linked by MaxEnt in so-
cial dynamical processes in experiments. We suggest the results
reported in this letter could be replicated in more general condi-
tions in the experiments of human subject social dynamics.
6.3. MaxEnt as a link between nature and social science
In economics, MaxEnt approach has gained its widely applica-
tions, e.g., in market equilibrium [2,28], in wealth and income dis-
tribution [9,31], in ﬁrm growth rates [1] in behavior modeling [30].
Theoretical interpreting or modeling of the distributions of social
outcomes with MaxEnt is growing.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the dynamic behavior
(both of the backward and forward transitions) obeys MaxEnt —
this point has never been empirically presented. Our ﬁnding of
the MaxEnt in dynamic behaviors in the experimental data can
be an encouraging information for investigating the potential
self-consistence of social outcome — both in static and dynamic
performance.
MaxEnt, as a technique, can be used to predict the geographic
distribution of any spatial phenomena, including plants and ani-
mals [22]. In the game theory condition, the spatial phenomena
of social behavior is the phenomena in strategy space, at the same
time, the absence or appearance of strategy is relative to the ab-
sence or appearance of species. This picture has been well built
[24] to unify the evolutionary theorems in biology science and so-
cial science. Our ﬁndings of the social behavior ﬁtting MaxEnt, both
in dynamic respect in this report and in static respect in [36], sug-
gest that human subject social systems and natural systems could
have wider common backgrounds.
For the future investigations, several points need to be consid-
ered. As we have shown in static [36] and in one step (xt±1) dynam-2 This ﬁndings of cycles in Rock–Paper–Scissors games [8] are supported by the
discrete time experiments of three different parameters of Rock–Paper–Scissors
games [34,35] from an independent research group.ics social behaviors obey MaxEnt, does any step transitions always
obey MaxEnt? What is the bound of the MaxEnt in social interac-
tion systems?
One can notice that, in the 11 games, all the social environ-
ments are different (for the payoff matrix is different), all the
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are different, however, all the
social transitions obeying MexEnt are indifferent.
6.4. Conclusion
By employing experimental economics data, we test the MaxEnt
hypothesis in social transitions. In the experimental constant sum
two-person 2  2 games, the results show that, not only the static
social state distributions obey MaxEnt [36], the distributions of the
social state transitions also ﬁt MaxEnt. This ﬁnding suggests that
MaxEnt can also be an approach for the social dynamics.
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